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Abstract 
Planning and controlling overall performance in decentralized organizations i a complex task for central 
management because it is confronted with incomplete information on organizational opportunities and possible 
conflicts of interest with local managers. Many formal procedures for the support of planning processes in 
decentralized organizations are based on decomposition methods for mathematical programming. Most of these 
procedures assume organizational decision models with a single overall goal that is supported by all decision makers 
involved. In this paper, a framework for an interactive heuristic planning procedure is proposed for decentralized 
organizational decision models with multiple goals that may be conflicting within and between decision levels. This 
procedure aims at solving the planning problem straightforwardly in a low number of information exchanges between 
the decision levels, which makes it more acceptable for decision makers in practice. 
Keywords: Financial planning; Goal programming; Multiple-criteria decision making 
I. Introduction 
The majority of today's large business firms 
have a divisionalized structure in which decision 
making authority and information is distributed 
over several management levels (for example 
Hoskisson et al., 1992). This decentralized struc- 
ture arises in response to the bounded rationality 
and opportunistic behaviour of organizational 
members and offers several advantages over cen- 
tralized structures (see for example Williamson, 
1987, Chapter 11). As centrally administered firms 
grow larger the danger of information and deci- 
* Corresponding author. 
sion making overload of central management in- 
creases. This calls for some delegation of decision 
tasks to divisional managers who have the knowl- 
edge to handle specific and relatively indepen- 
dent problems. Controlling the firm's overall 
business portfolio and corporate financing are 
central management's main responsibility. De- 
centralized structures reduce possibilities of ad- 
verse discretionary behaviour of managers whose 
performance is difficult to measure in centrally 
controlled organizations. Also the motivation of 
divisional managers may be enhanced because of 
the acquired responsibility and authority (see for 
example Mintzberg, 1979, Chapter 20). On the 
other hand, a loss of control of central manage- 
ment over the firm's activities arises because of 
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lack of information on divisional opportunities, 
which can lead to a sub-optimal solution to the 
organizational decision problem from an overall 
perspective. Furthermore, conflicts of interest can 
arise when divisional managers not only try to 
contribute to central goals but also pursue their 
own, local goals. To mitigate these effects, decen- 
tralized planning and coordination procedures are 
required (cf. Burton and Obel, 1984). For exam- 
ple, consider a company with two or more divi- 
sions that undertake activities generating cash 
flows in foreign currencies. Without any form of 
coordination by central financial management, 
each division might decide to hedge its own cur- 
rency risk. However, the currency risk for the 
company as a whole might be negligible if divi- 
sional cash flows in the same currency are of 
opposite sign. In that case, divisional hedging 
would be redundant and suboptimal. To reduce 
these and other costs of decentralization, it is 
necessary to use planning and coordination pro- 
cedures that enable central management to care- 
fully balance divisional activities. 
In Section 2, we present a brief review of 
decentralized organizational decision models and 
procedures found in the literature, In Section 3 
we propose a framework for an interactive 
heuristic planning and coordination procedure 
for so-called compromise organizational decision 
models with multiple goals. The procedure is 
essentially budget-oriented, allows for multiple 
goals at all levels and seeks to derive an organiza- 
tional compromise solution in a straightforward 
manner, without using shadowprices or detailed 
information on decision makers' preferences. An 
illustrative application of the interactive proce- 
Holistic/Single goal Holistic/Multiple goals 
Max c' x = z t Max Cx = z 
K K 
s.t. ~'~Bkxk <<.b, s.t. EBkxk  <~b, 
k=l  k=l  
AkXk<~ak fo rk=l , . . . ,K  AkXk<~ak fo rk=l , . . . ,K  
e.g.: Dantzig and Wolfe (1961), Ten Kate (1972), e.g.: Rietveld (1980), Goedhart (1994) 
Burton and Obel (1984) 
Compromise/Single goal Compromise/Multiple goals 
Max c' x = z I Max Cx = z 
Max h'kx=dkl fo rk=l  . . . . .  K Max Hkxk=d k fo rk=l  . . . . .  K 
K K 
s.t~ ~Bkxk<~b, s.t. Y'.Bkx~<~b, 
k=l  k=l  
AkX k <~a k for k= l , . . . ,K  Akx  k <~a k for k=l , . . . ,K  
e.g.: Ruefli (1971), Freeland and Baker (1975) e.g.: Reimers (1985), Haimes et al. (1990), 
Goedhart (1994) 
where: 
z: (1 × m) vector of central goal variables, z' =- (z1 , . . .  , z i , . . .  , Zm}. 
c: Vector (1 × n) of goal coefficients for firm's activities. 
x: Instrument vector (1 x n), indicating firm's activity level; the vector is partitioned as x' --- {X'l . . . . .  x~ . . . . .  x~,}. 
Bk: Matrix (p  x n k) of overall technological coefficients for division k. 
b: Vector (1 xp)  indicating scarce overall resources. 
Ak: Matrix (r k × nk) of divisional technological coefficients for division k. 
ak: Vector (1 × r k) for divisional resources and technological restrictions. 
C: Matrix (mx n) of central goal coefficients. 
c: Vector (1 x n) of goal coefficients for firms' activities. 
hk: (1 x n k) vector of divisional goal coefficients. 
Hk: Matrix (m k x n k) of divisional goal coefficients for division k. 
Fig. 1. Four categories of organizational decision models. 
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dure to a financial planning problem in a decen- 
tralized firm is presented in Section 4. 
2. Organizational decision making: Models and 
procedures 
Some interesting models of organizational de- 
cision making and associated planning proce- 
dures originate from decomposition methods in 
mathematical programming designed by Dantzig 
and Wolfe and by Ten Kate (see for example 
Burton and Obel, 1984, or Dirickx and Jenner- 
gren, 1979, for an overview). These methods plit 
the original programming problem into several, 
more amenable subproblems and a master prob- 
lem. The subproblems are separately optimized, 
conditional on some parameters that are itera- 
tively updated by the master problem. Baumol 
and Fabian (1964) already noted the similarities 
with planning and coordination procedures in 
decentralized organizations. The subproblems can 
be regarded as the divisional decision problems 
and the master problem as that of central man- 
agement. The original problem before decompo- 
sition represents the overall organizational deci- 
sion problem. The Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition 
method can be interpreted as a form of price 
coordination and Ten Kate's method as a form of 
budget coordination. 
Here, we make a distinction between decision 
models, which represent he organizational deci- 
sion problems, and decision methods, i.e. the 
procedures that are used to solve these problems. 
In classifying the organizational decision models 
that - implicitly - underlie the wide range of 
existing procedures based on decomposition 
methods, we employ two elementary criteria: the 
degree of cooperation and the number of goals in 
the organizational decision problem. Based on 
these two criteria, four general categories of lin- 
ear organizational decision models are formu- 
lated as shown in Fig. 1. In each model, vector b 
forms the right-hand side for the so-called com- 
mon restrictions, which apply to more than one 
division, representing for example shared use of 
scarce resources or interdivisional deliveries. The 
division-specific restrictions with right-hand side 
a k apply to division k only. Holistic models rep- 
resent situations in which all divisional decision 
makers fully support the goals of the central 
decision maker. These models represent decen- 
tralization of information but no decentralization 
in decision making. In compromise models, how- 
ever, divisional decision makers primarily pursue 
their own goals, which may be conflicting with the 
central goals. Compromise models are more real- 
istic because they represent autonomous decision 
making with divisional managers taking account 
of, possibly legitimate, local interests (cf. Free- 
land and Baker, 1975). Across the four categories 
'the solution' to the organizational decision model 
is defined in a different manner. In the holistic 
single-goal model, it is defined as the solution 
z 1 =c 'x*  for which the objective function z l 
reaches its maximum value. In holistic multiple- 
goal models it is the most preferred solution 
z *= Cx * that maximizes some implicit prefer- 
ence function Po(z). l ' The  solution' to compro- 
mise single-goal models is defined as the set of 
values for the goal variables (zl*, dl*l . . . . .  dkl)  
that are Pareto-efficient with respect o all indi- 
vidual objective functions (cf. Freeland and Baker, 
1975). For compromise models with multiple 
goals, the solution is the set of values for the goal 
vectors (z *, dl* . . . . .  d k) that are Pareto-efficient 
with respect o the implicit preference functions 
Po(z), P l (d l )  . . . . .  PK(dl¢) of all individual deci- 
sion makers. Following Bogetoft et al. (1994), we 
define these as organizationally efficient compro- 
mise solutions. The four categories of organiza- 
tional models thus have different types of solu- 
tions and call for different ypes of solution meth- 
ods. 
The models in Fig. 1 stand for the hypotheti- 
cal, overall organizational problem, i.e. the prob- 
lem that the organization as a whole would like to 
1 Interactive solution methods for multiple goal problems 
optimize the implicit preference function by collecting infor- 
mation from the decision maker on his preferences in a series 
of man-model interactions (see Stewart, 1992, for an overview). 
Alternatively, the solution to a multiple goal problem is some- 
times defined as the set of non-dominated values for the goal 
vector z, which can be found by some vector-maximum algo- 
rithm (see Steuer, 1986, for an overview). 
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solve (cf. Sweeney et al., 1978). In decentralized 
organizations this problem is solved by a group of 
decision makers who all have information on only 
part of the overall organizational problem. Divi- 
sional decision makers do not have information 
on the effects of their decisions on the perfor- 
mance of other divisions and the organization as 
a whole, as is modelled in the common restric- 
tions. On the other hand, the central decision 
maker lacks information on the local conditions 
represented by the division-specific restrictions. 
This is why special planning and coordination 
procedures are required to solve decentralized 
models. Many of these procedures are based on 
decomposition methods and operate in an itera- 
tive manner by exchanging information between 
the decision levels in a series of planning cycles. 
In most of these procedures, central management 
directs divisional decisions towards appropriate 
activities by means of prices or budgets for scarce 
resources and transfers, or some combination of 
prices and budgets (see for example Reimers, 
1985, or Burton and Obel, 1984, for an overview). 
In general, the solution that is derived with a 
planning and coordination procedure is not as 
good as the solution to the overall organizational 
problem and the difference can be seen as the 
cost of decentralization (cf. Rietveld, 1980). 
Most planning procedures found in the litera- 
ture are based on decomposition methods and 
assume holistic single-goal models in which the 
overall organizational problem is modelled as a 
linear program with a single objective function. 
Divisional decision makers in fact only supply 
central management with information about pos- 
sible activities and implement he latter's deci- 
sions, so that there is no genuine decentralized 
decision making. Practical applications of these 
procedures to resource allocation in decentral- 
ized firms were made in the seventies ( ee Burton 
and Obel, 1984, or Dirickx and Jennergren, 1979, 
for extensive overviews). In the area of decentral- 
ized financial planning, Maier and Vander Weide, 
(1976) and Carleton et al., (1974) presented e- 
composition-based procedures to allocate scarce 
financial funds over various investment projects 
in divisionalized firms. Freeland and Baker, (1975) 
and Ruefli (1971) developed planning procedures 
for compromise single-goal models, which were 
based on decomposition methods applied to goal 
programming. Rietveld (1980) describes an inter- 
active planning procedure that is budget-directive 
for a holistic multiple goal model, with an applica- 
tion in regional economic planning. For the same 
model category, an interactive planning proce- 
dure that employs both prices and budgets can be 
found in Goedhart (1994). Very few planning 
procedures exist for the most complex category of 
models: the compromise multiple goal models, in 
which each division k (k = 1 .. . .  , K) and the cen- 
tral decision maker have several goal variables dk 
and z. Sometimes the multiple goal problem is 
translated in a goal programming format, so that 
in the end a single objective function per decision 
level results (see Ruefli, 1971, or Freeland and 
Baker, 1975). But this approach requires that the 
decision maker explicitly formulates his prefer- 
ences a-priori and that these can be appropriately 
described in a goal programming format. As this 
may not always be possible in practice, it is more 
realistic to model decision problems at all levels 
as genuine multiple-goal problems. This complies 
better with the notion that managers at all levels 
are confronted with a complex of goal variables 
and have only implicit knowledge of their prefer- 
ences over these variables (Spronk, 1985). Haimes 
et al. (1990) developed interactive solution meth- 
ods for non-linear models with multiple levels 
and multiple goals, which are numerically inten- 
sive and require a high number of information 
exchanges between the decision levels. Therefore, 
they are not very suitable as blueprints for plan- 
ning procedures. Reimers (1985) presented a 
heuristic budget-directive planning procedure 
based on an interactive multiple-goal solution 
method, STEM. His procedure differs from the 
one proposed by us in Section 4 in that it does 
not explicitly seek to attain a compromise solu- 
tion that is organizationally efficient. 
Based on viewpoints on decentralization from 
economic and organizational theory, we formu- 
late a list of minimum requirements for decen- 
tralized planning procedures. The requirements 
roughly correspond to those suggested by Schmidt 
and Leichtful3 (1986), Burton and Obel (1978) 
and Sweeney et al. (1978) and concern both tech- 
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nical and behavioural properties. A lot of atten- 
tion has been given in the literature to technical 
properties, uch as goal achievement and conver- 
gence. Goal achievement concerns whether the 
derived solution is feasible for the entire organi- 
zation and how close it is to the overall optimal 
solution or, in case of multiple goal models, to a 
non-dominated solution. Convergence properties 
regard the number of planning cycles that is 
required to arrive at the derived solution and the 
feasibility or near-optimality of the intermediate 
solutions generated in the planning cycles prior 
to termination (see Burton and Obel, 1978, for 
details). In our opinion, technical properties play 
an important but not exclusive part in assessing 
the quality of decentralized planning procedures. 
Also behavioural properties, uch as a procedure's 
complexity and motivational effects are important 
because these are crucial for the acceptance of 
the procedure by its future users. The complexity 
of the procedure concerns its ease of use, as 
measured by for example the amount of informa- 
tion required from the decision makers involved 
and the difficulty of providing that information. 
Motivational effects refer to what extent a proce- 
dure can convince its future users that they are 
better off by using it. 
Some important conclusions follow from eco- 
nomic and organizational theory for the design of 
useful and practicable procedures for decentral- 
ized planning. Theory provides us with the condi- 
tions under which decentralized organizations 
arise and thus implicitly with some caveats for 
procedural design. This leads to the following 
technical requirements. Because decision and in- 
formation overload of central management is one 
of the main reasons for decentralization, planning 
procedures should not involve too many informa- 
tion exchanges between management levels. In 
general, price- and budget-directive planning pro- 
cedures that are based decomposition methods 
converge to the optimal solution of the overall 
model in a finite, but possibly high number of 
planning cycles. In many cases, this number grows 
too large for practical purposes (cf. Burton and 
Obel, 1984, p. 13 and Atkins, 1974). Dynamic 
market conditions favour decentralized decision 
making but also imply that information is often 
uncertain and inaccurate. As a consequence, pro- 
cedures hould produce a satisfactory solution in 
a few planning cycles rather than a 'razor-edge' 
optimal solution in a large number of planning 
cycles. Furthermore, a procedure should generate 
intermediate solutions that are feasible so that 
the planning process can be truncated prior to 
optimality when management finds that the cur- 
rent solution is good enough. Behavioural re- 
quirements tate that bounded rationality calls 
for planning procedures to be easy to compre- 
hend for all decision makers involved, without 
requiring complex information. This implies that 
a procedure preferably should not ask decision 
makers to provide shadowprices for resources or 
marginal preference trade-offs, as in many de- 
composition-based procedures. Decision makers 
should not have to specify their preferences a- 
priori, as is the case in goal programming ap- 
proaches. Furthermore, planning procedures 
should not undo the motivational effects from 
decentralization that arise from subordinates hav- 
ing decision making power and responsibility. A 
procedure should allow for some form of genuine 
decentralized ecision making: divisional man- 
agers should have the opportunity to take ac- 
count of local circumstances that are unknown to 
central management, but may be quite legitimate. 
Ideally, procedures should also leave little or no 
room for opportunistic behaviour of divisional 
managers by creating a good incentive structure 
(see Groves and Loeb, 1979, or Jennergren, 1980). 
Here, we abstract from such moral hazard prob- 
lems. 
3. Planning with an interactive heuristic 
Following the requirements stated above, a 
decentralized planning procedure should be based 
on an underlying compromise multiple goal 
model. An interactive budget-oriented planning 
procedure is proposed which operates in an itera- 
tive manner. It differs from decomposition-based 
approaches to decentralized planning in the fol- 
lowing respects. The communication between de- 
cision levels is structured in terms of sets of 
alternatives in order to reduce the number of 
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planning cycles required to produce a feasible 
solution to the overall problem. Multiple local 
goals are explicitly taken into consideration i  the 
planning procedure, which aims at generating a 
close-to-efficient compromise solution. 
Furthermore, the procedure is designed to 
handle multiple-goal problems at both decision 
levels interactively, without the decision-maker 
having to explicitly define his preference function 
a-priori. The basic model is of the compromise 
type with multiple goals, as shown in Fig. 1. In 
the interactive procedure only straightforward in-
formation is exchanged: ecision makers do not 
1. Initialization phase: 
Central Management: 
a. declares extreme values for resources and goals 
Divisional Management: 
b. optimizes for central goals z k ; 
c. formulate divisional optimal solution ( Y-k, dk) 
d. report initial proposals 
. . . . .  
2. Planning phase (cycle s): 
Central Management: 
a. updates central decision problem with 
divisional proposals 
b. selects intermediate optimal solution z * 
c. imposes targets and budgets on 
divisions ( z ;  s, b ;  s) 
Divisional Management: 
- -  d. selects proposals ubject o targets and 
budgets ( 2~,/~ )
3. Coordination phase: 
Central Management. 
a. select organizational compromise solution z * * 
b. set final targets and budgets (zk* *, bk* * ) 
Divisional Management." 
c. select activities ubject o final targets 
and budgets 
Fig. 2. Interactive planning procedure. 
have to formulate any shadowprices on resource 
transfers or marginal preference trade-offs. Cen- 
tral managements sets budgets and targets and 
divisional managers respond with activity propos- 
als. In contrast o the multiple goal compromise 
planning procedure of Reimers (1985), the proce- 
dure explicitly seeks for a compromise solution 
that is close to Pareto-efficient with respect o 
central and divisional decision makers, i.e. orga- 
nizationally efficient. Finally, the procedure con- 
tains some heuristic elements in the selection of 
divisional proposals. It operates in three succes- 
sive phases: an initialization phase, a planning 
phase and a coordination phase (see Fig. 2). 
ad 1. Initialization phase. This phase helps the 
procedure to generate good intermediate solu- 
tions in the first few planning cycles by giving 
central management i formation on a wide range 
of divisional solutions. In the first cycle (s = 1), 
central management communicates information 
on the overall availability of resources and mini- 
mum requirements on goal contributions to the 
divisions. Each division subsequently formulates a 
series of initial proposals. This series contains the 
optimal solutions for the divisional decision prob- 
lems for each central goal variable (1) and the 
solution (2k, d k) ^lk - ( z  k,d/k) that is most pre- 
ferred by the division itself (2). 
Thus, for each division k the following prob- 
lems are solved: 
Max CkjX k=zk~, fo r j= l  . . . . .  m 
s.t. AkXk <_ak . (1) 
[ CkXk = Z k 
Max 
Hk X k = dk J (2) 
s.t. AkX k <_ a k . 
Problem (2) is solved by means of an interactive 
solution method for multiple goal models. In our 
planning procedure we propose Interactive Mul- 
tiple Goal Programming (IMGP), although other 
methods uch as for example STEM, might be 
used instead (see Spronk, 1985, and Stewart, 1992, 
for an overview). By also solving problem (2), the 
proposals reflect not only divisional opportunities 
for the realization for central goals but also divi- 
sional preferences over the proposals. Thus, a 
168 M.H. Goedhart, J. Spronk / European Journal of Operational Research 86 (1995) 162-175 
series of initial proposals is obtained, each stating 
the divisional contribution to central goal vari- 
ables and associated levels of resources used: 
with 
~i k = Ck2 k, bi k = Bk.~ k for i = 1 . . . . .  I~. 
ad 2. Planning phase. During the planning 
phase additional information on divisional oppor- 
tunities is reported to central management on the 
basis of centrally administered targets and bud- 
gets. By taking strictly convex combinations of the 
divisional proposals (2~, b~), central management 
constructs an inner approximation of the divi- 
sional opportunities in terms of resource usage 
and goal contribution. 
This leads to the following central decision 
problem: 
K lk 
Max z = E E i^i Yk Zk 
k=l  i=1  
K lk 
s.t. ~ i ^i  Ykbk < b 
k=l  i=1  
lk 
~y i= l  fo rk=l  K, k , "  " ' ,  
i=1  
y~,>0 for all k , i ,  
where 
Ik: Number of proposals received from division k 
in the current planning cycle s and all previous 
cycles ( I  k = m + 1 in first planning cycle). 
Central management solves this multiple goal 
problem for the centrally most preferred solution 
z * ~ = Cx * ~ with IMGP (see Section 4 for details). 
The intermediate solution z * s is an underestima- 
tion of the truly attainable solution because it is 
selected from an inner approximation of the over- 
all model. If central management is not yet satis- 
fied with intermediate solution z * ~, targets for 
goal contributions and budgets for resources, 
(z~ ~, b~0, are derived as directions for each of 
the divisions: 
{(z [  s ,b ;s ) , . . . , ( zk  s ,b~s)}  
with 
*s  *s  _ *s  zk = CkXk , b lS  _ BkXk  . 
The targets and budgets are imposed on the 
divisions and represent the most preferred divi- 
sional plan from the viewpoint of central manage- 
ment, given the currently available information. 
In the planning phase, the divisions gather infor- 
mation on their opportunities in the neighbour- 
hood of the central targets and budgets. In the 
same way as in the initialization phase, each 
division makes a series of proposals. But now the 
proposals are selected subject to the targets and 
budgets, within some pre-specified tolerance 
range of 6% so that the following restrictions are 
added to models (1)-(2) above: 
CkX k ~ (1 - 6)z~,  
B~x~ <_ (1 + 6)b~. 
In each planning cycle s, such a series of propos- 
als is reported to the central level, so that more 
and more column vectors (~,  ^i b k) are added to 
the central program above, thereby gradually im- 
proving central management's approximation of 
the feasible set. 
ad 3. Coordination phase. When at some stage 
in the planning process, central management is 
satisfied with the current intermediate solution 
z *, the procedure nters the coordination phase. 
This solution z * does not yet explicitly take 
account of the quality of the solution for the 
divisions. But from the initial proposal (,~g, bk) to 
problem (2) in the initialization phase, central 
management knows what budget and target allo- 
cation corresponds to the divisional optimum so- 
lution for each of the divisions. Central manage- 
ment now chooses a final organizational compro- 
mise solution from the following problem: 
K /k 
Max z E E i^i = ykzk  
k=l  i=1  
Min ek fo rk=l  . . . . .  K 
(3) 
M.H. Goedhart, J. Spronk / European Journal of Operational Research 86 (1995) 162-175 169 
K /k 
s.t. ~ ~ Ykbki ^i <b ,  
k=l  i=1  
E l  k i ^i i = t Yk Zk/-- ~kj [ 
e k >_ 
~'kj 
for j = 1 . . . . .  m and for k = 1 , . . . ,K ,  
E~A i ^ i - -bk j  Ykbki 
e k >_ 
bkj 
for j= l  . . . . .  p and fo rk=l  . . . . .  K, 
lk 
~]Y ik=l  fo rk=l , . . . ,K ,  
i=1  
y~>__0 for a l l k ,  i. 
Thus, a compromise solution z * * is selected with 
associated final targets and budgets (z~ *, b~ *), 
which also takes account of the solutions that are 
preferred by the divisions. The new goal variables 
e k are minimax distance measures 2 that reflect 
the extent to which each division k can realize its 
most preferred proposal (~%, bk) when con- 
fronted with the final targets and budgets 
(z~ *, b~ *). In this kind of implicit hierarchical 
bargaining, central management determines the 
appropriate balance between divisional goal real- 
ization and central goal realization (cf. Schnee- 
weiB, 1995). Central management has gathered 
information on what is achievable in terms of its 
own goals in the planning phase and determines 
an organizational compromise solution in the co- 
ordination phase, while taking account of divi- 
sional preferences. Alternatively, an explicit bar- 
gaining process among all central and divisional 
managers could be executed to collectively select 
a compromise solution (for example SchneeweiB, 
1992, Chapter 5; see Franz et al., 1992, for an 
overview of multiple goal group decision making). 
The final targets and budgets are imposed upon 
the divisions in the implementation stage, during 
which each division selects its most preferred 
solution subject to the final targets and budgets. 
Because the divisional opportunity sets are un- 
derestimated in problem (3) relative to the true 
overall decision problem in Fig. 1, the resulting 
compromise solution z * * is not always exactly 
organizationally efficient. How close z * * is to an 
organizationally efficient solution, depends on the 
quality of the central approximation of the divi- 
sional opportunity sets (see Section 4). 
4. An illustration in financial planning 
Below we demonstrate the application of the 
interactive planning procedure to a financial 
planning problem in a divisionalized firm with 
two management levels. Central management is
responsible for the overall business portfolio and 
financing policy and divisional management de- 
cides on more operational issues. At both levels 
multiple goals are pursued: central management 
wants to maximize the firm's market value to its 
shareholders and to optimize its risk profile. Un- 
der conditions of perfect financial markets only 
shareholder value is a relevant company goal, but 
market imperfections can lead to the additional 
goal of controlling the firm's risk profile (cf. 
Shapiro and Titman, 1986). The risk profile is an 
indication of the chances of financial distress and 
is described in this example in terms of the aver- 
age debt level and the sensitivities 3 of share- 
holder value to changes in two risk factors: mar- 
ket demand and the currency rate. The central 
decision problem is to find the combination of 
investment and financing decisions over a 5-year 
planning period that leads to the best result in 
terms of shareholder value and risk profile. As 
explained in the introduction to this paper ,  the 
existence of these multiple goals in the firm im- 
plies that divisional contributions to central goals 
have to be carefully balanced. Furthermore, divi- 
sional dependencies that arise from the common 
use of scarce resources call for central coordina- 
2 In the proposed procedure other measures to reflect 
'divisional desirability' of a solution could be used instead, 
such as for example some average distance measure. 
3 A sensitivity S j is defined as S j =- AV/AF/. It states how 
much the shareholder value V changes for a unit change in a 
specific risk factor F j - such as for example the currency rate 
- and it may be positive, negative or zero. 
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tion. This is modelled in the financial 'sources- 
uses' equations (8) below. 
2 5 [ ro T 
Max V= k=lE PVk+ t=lE [Dt ( l+rd) ,  
rc(1 - T) - r d 
+C, ( i  +Z) ;  ) (4) 
Min ~1 = [Sll (5) 
Min ~2= [$2t (6) 
1 5 
Min D = ~ t EDt=I (7) 
s.t. 
2 
E CF~ +D t -  (1 +rd)Dt_ 1 
k=l 
-C  t + (1 + rc)Ct_ 1 = 0, 
C t>_rdD t for t= l , . . . ,5 ,  
2 
SJ= Y'~S~ for j= l  . . . . .  2, 
k=l  
(8) 
(9) 
where: 
V: 
PVk: 
Dt: 
rd: 
Ct: 
r~: 
T: 
(10) 
Firm's shareholder value. 
Present value contributed by division k. 
Amount of debt financing in period t. 
Cost of debt financing. 
Investment in liquid assets in period t. 
Rate of return on liquid assets, rc < r d. 
Corporate tax rate. 
Unsigned value of the firm's overall sensi- 
tivity for changes in risk factor j. 
D: Firm's average debt level. 
S~: Sensitivity of division k's present value for 
changes in risk factor j. 
CF~: Cash flow generated by division k in year 
t. 
According to the concept of adjusted present 
value, the shareholder value of the firm equals 
the present value of its real assets plus the value 
of its debt financing, which is positive because of 
tax savings, plus the value of its liquid assets, 
which is negative (see for example Brealey and 
Myers, 1991, Chapter 19). This is stated in the 
first goal variable V, in (4). The unsigned value of 
both factor sensitivities S1, S 2 is to be minimized 
because exposure to positive as well as negative 
changes in the risk factors is considered to be 
relevant and is modelled in Eqs. (5)-(6) and (10). 
The average debt level D over the next five years, 
which serves as a proxy for the firm's insolvency 
risk, is to be minimized (7). Furthermore, the 
firm's liquid assets hould at least cover the inter- 
est payable on debt financing in each year (9). In 
solving this model, central management essen- 
tially faces two problems. First, it does not know 
which combinations of (PV k , S 1 , S 2 , CF 1 . . . . .  CF 5) 
are feasible for each division because of a lack of 
information on local, division-specific restrictions. 
This means that central management can not 
decide on the assignment of divisional targets and 
budgets that lead to the centrally most preferred 
solution. Another difficulty is that central man- 
agement does not know which of these combina- 
tions are preferred by divisional management and 
that it therefore can not decide on a suitable 
organizational compromise solution. 
Divisional management has two goals. It tries 
to maximize the net present value PV~ of its 
investments and thereby directly contributes to 
the first central goal. But it also pursues a purely 
divisional goal, namely to maximize the employ- 
ment level within the division EMP k. This can 
give rise to some conflict with the central goals. 
The divisional decision models for k = 1 . . . . .  2 
are as follows: 
nk 
Max PVg = ~ XkiPVki (11) 
i=1 
Nk 
Max EMP k = ~ xkiEMP~i (12) 
i=1 
Nk 
s.t. CF~= ~_,XkiCF[, i for t= 1 . . . . .  5, (13) 
i=1 
Nk 
SJk = ~_, xkiS~i for i = 1 . . . . .  2, (14) 
i=1 
Nk 
~_~ Akixki <_ a~, (15) 
i=1 
where: 
Xki: Decision variable for investment in pro- 
ject i in division k: 0 <Xki < 1. 
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Table 1 
Init ial  proposals for division 1 
171 
Proposal  ~'V1i $1 i g~i 6F~i (~F12i CF3i CF14i t~F15i eu 
i = 1 261.6 - 96.2 16.8 - 157.1 142.9 - 78.8 69.7 71.4 0.87 
i = 2 294.4 - 72.9 17.9 - 169.7 125.9 - 296.2 141.8 239.7 0.99 
i = 3 30.4 25.3 7.8 - 21.0 3.7 - 186.8 80.0 174.1 0.34 
i = 4 214.8 -35 .8  0.1 - 158.3 116.7 -309 .8  244.5 89.1 0.75 
i = 5 177.4 - 59.2 30.6 - 48.1 - 12.8 55.9 38.4 223.3 0.70 
i = 6 291.2 66.9 16.9 - 172.2 113.2 - 289.8 133.4 258.8 1.00 
PWki: Present value of investment project i in 
division k. 
EMPki: Incremental employment for investment 
project i in division k. 
CF~i: Cash flow generated by investment pro- 
ject i in division k in year t. 
S~i: Sensitivity of the value of project k for 
changes in risk factor j. 
Aki: Subvector (r k x 1) of matrix Ak,  con- 
taining technological coefficients for in- 
vestment project Xki in division k. 
ak: Vector (1 × rk) for divisional resources 
and technological restrictions. 
The equations in (15) represent local restrictions 
on the choice of investment projects xki that are 
specific to each division (i = 1, . . . ,  Ark). 
In directing the divisions towards appropriate 
investments, central management can impose 
budgets for annual cash flows and targets for 
contributions to central goals, which restrict the 
divisional model in (11)-(15) above: 
PV K >_ PVk*, (16) 
S~_<S~* for j= l  . . . . .  2, (17) 
CF~>_CF~* for t= l , . . . ,5 .  (18) 
Central management has to set these targets 
and budgets in such a way that a compromise 
solution for the firm's investment and financing 
problem results that provides satisfactory values 
for shareholder value and the risk profile and at 
the same time gives divisions sufficient opportu- 
nity to realize their own goals. How this can be 
achieved with the interactive planning procedure 
is discussed in the remainder of the section. 
The initialization phase starts with central 
management imposing some absolute minimum 
requirements on the divisions that have to be 
complied with in any case. Subject o these bounds 
on the sensitivities for factor risk allowed, mini- 
mal present value and cash flow requirements, 
the divisions formulate a set of initial proposals. 
The set contains the solutions 
(~gki,  ^1 ^2 ^ 1 ^ 5 ) Ski, Ski, CFk i , ' " ,  CFk i ,  eki 
(for i = 1 . . . .  ,5) that result when independently 
optimizing the contributions to central goals, i.e. 
the present value PV k and both factor sensitivi- 
ties S 1, S 2. The sensitivities are maximized as 
well as minimized because at the outset it is not 
clear whether a division should have positive or 
negative sensitivities. In this example, divisional 
managers also assign a solution quality index ~ 
to each proposal, reflecting its proximity to the 
divisionally most preferred plan, for which ~[k = 1 
( I  k = m + 1): 4 
Pk( ^i dik) ^i Zk ' 
e k = for i = 1 . . . . .  I k . 
Table 2 
Potency matrix in p lanning cycle 2 
v 31 3 2 b 
Ideal  values 398.6 0 0 58.5 
Requi red values 198.5 - 164.7 40.8 106.7 
4 This part icular implementat ion of the f ramework for the 
interactive procedure requires that the - implicit ly known - 
divisional preference functions Pk(') are l inear. In case of less 
str ingent assumptions on these preference functions, the more 
general  approach as depicted in Section 3 can always be 
employed. 
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Table 3 
Targets and budgets in cycle 2 
Division PVk* S 1. S 2. CF 1" CF~* CF~* CF~ 4. CF~* 
k = 1 254.9 - 93.3 17.9 - 148.4 130.5 - 68 61.1 83.5 
k = 2 20.9 49.2 2.8 - 17.4 2.7 - 1.9 - 26.5 54.3 
In this way, the proposals reflect not only 
divisional opportunities for the realization of cen- 
tral goals but also divisional preferences over the 
proposals. Furthermore, a division solves its own 
multiple goal problem for the most preferred 
solution from its own point of view, i.e. including 
its employment goal by means of IMGP.  5 This 
implies that each division reports six proposals to 
central management.  For division 1 these are 
presented in Table 1, where proposal i = 6 is the 
division's most preferred solution with an em- 
ployment level of EMP 1 = 112. 
In the planning phase, central management 
updates its information by adding the proposals 
made by each division k to the central decision 
model from (4)-(10): 
lk 
PV k = ~ YkiPVki, 
i=1 
E J^ 
= YkiSki, 
i=l 
Ik 
E YkifFki, CF~= ^ t 
i=1 
with 
lk 
E Yki = 1. 
i=1 
The updated model is solved by means of 
IMGP for the most preferred solution, given the 
currently available information (Ik is the total 
number of proposals received from division k). In 
IMGP,  a multiple goal decision problem is sum- 
marized in a potency matrix as in Table 2. This 
5 In the example, all most preferred solutions and proposals 
were determined by assuming some preference functions PI(' ), 
/'2(') and Po(') for divisional and central management. 
gJA , 
~J . . . .  I 
g)deat* 
g ~eq~ 
arequu "ed required" ideal 
oi gi gi 
Fig. 3. Increasing the required goal value. 
gi 
matrix shows for each goal variable the so-called 
ideal value and the required value. The ideal 
value is the best attainable value for some goal 
variable when it is optimized subject to the re- 
quired values for all other goal variables. For 
each goal variable, the required values are inter- 
actively raised by the decision maker until they 
are equal to the ideal values for all goal variables 
or until the solution is good enough 6 (see Spronk, 
1985, for more details). 
The intermediate solution selected by central 
management in the second planning cycle is 
{286,-  44.1, 20.76, 90.7}. 
This solution is not yet satisfactory for central 
management because of the substantial sensitivity 
for changes in market demand and therefore the 
6 Essentially, a potency matrix is a summary of the feasible 
region in criterion space, restricted by the required goal 
values. In IMGP the required values are updated in such a 
way that the optimal solution lies in the restricted feasible set. 
Fig. 3 shows the effect of increasing the required goal value 
from grequired tO grequired*. 
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Table 4 
Potency matrix in coordination phase 
V H 1 ~2 ~ el e2 
Idealvalues 417.2 0 0 58.0 0.94 1.00 
Required values 196.2 -159.4 42.5 114.9 0.66 0.49 
Table 6 
Successive intermediate solutions 
Cycle P0 V ~1 ~2 ~ el e2 
2 142 286 -44.1 20.76 90.7 0.58 0.86 
3 160 260 - 14.9 17.8 96.0 0.58 0.72 
Final 148 266 -25.1 18.3 97.3 0.70 0.73 
procedure continues. From the intermediate so- 
lution follow the goal and sensitivity targets 7and 
cash flow budgets for both divisions (see Table 3). 
Subject to these targets and budgets plus or mi- 
nus a deviation ~ of 10%, each division formu- 
lates a new set of proposals and reports these to 
central management. 
In the third cycle, central management again 
updates its inner approximation of divisional op- 
portunities with the new proposals and, just as in 
the previous cycle, selects an intermediate solu- 
tion with IMGP: 
{260,- 14.9, 17.8, 96} 
(see Table 6, second row). This solution is consid- 
ered satisfactory by central management so that 
the planning phase ends. 
Max e k = E i^ i  y,e k fo rk=l  . . . .  ,K.  (19) 
i=1 
In the coordination phase central management 
tries to determine a suitable organizational com- 
promise solution that takes account of divisional 
preferences without giving in too much on the 
quality of the central goal values. Now, the divi- 
sional solution quality indexes e 1 and e 2 from Eq. 
(19) are included as goal variables in the central 
7 Because the unsigned value for each sensitivity is mini- 
mized, it is not clear in advance whether the divisional targets 
should be S~ > S~* or S~ < S~*. In each cycle this depends on 
the sign of $i: in cycle 2 the targets are therefore formulated 
as S~ > Sk TM and S~ < S 2.. 
decision problem stated earlier in Eq. (3). Start- 
ing from the potency matrix in Table 4, the final 
compromise solution is chosen with associated 
final targets and budgets for divisional present 
value, factor sensitivities and cash flows. These 
are all summarized in Table 5; the value of (e l, e 2) 
in this solution is (0.70, 0.73). 
Table 6 contains all intermediate solutions 
during the planning cycles, including the values of 
the -implicit-central preference function P0 and 
(el, e2). It shows how the planning phase serves 
to secure a satisfactory central solution and that 
in the coordination phase the central manager 
gives in somewhat to the realization of divisional 
goals. 
Of course, it is interesting to measure how 
close the final compromise solution comes to a 
solution that is Pareto-optimal with respect o all 
decision makers. Following Bogetoft et al. (1994), 
we measured this in the following way: 
Max g 
s.t. eo( x ) >_ ge~ * , 
Pk(x)  >gP~* for k= 1,2, 
x~F,  g>0,  
where: 
P0('), Pk('): Central, divisional preference func- 
tion; P0* *, P** * are the values cor- 
responding to the final compromise 
solution z * * from Table 6. 
Table 5 
Final compromise solution 
Unit PV//NV S 1 S 2 D EMP CF 1 CF 2 CF 3 CF 4 CF 5 
Division 1 26.7 39.0 3.3 - 113 -18.9 1.3 -0.5 -24.8 54.1 
Division 2 227.4 - 64.1 15.0 - 69 - 143.2 112.4 - 69.8 80.1 0.7 
Overall 265.5 - 25.1 18.3 97.3 182 - 162.1 113.7 - 70.3 55.3 54.8 
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x: Vector of all instrument variables in 
overall decision model. 
F: Feasible set in overall decision 
model. 
For this particular example, the maximum for 
g is 1.02, which means that the compromise solu- 
tion arrived at could be improved by 2% for each 
preference function if all information would be 
centrally available. Because of the fact that each 
division reports a set of proposals in each plan- 
ning cycle that cover a wide range of possible 
outcomes, the approximation f divisional oppor- 
tunities is in this example quite reasonable, after 
only three cycles. 
optimal. The quality of the compromise solution 
strongly depends on the quality of the approxima- 
tion of divisional opportunities that is generated 
by the procedure at the central decision level. 
From numerical experience with the procedure it
seems that this approximation of divisional op- 
portunities is quite reasonable within very few 
iterations (Goedhart and Spronk, 1994). Never- 
theless, more research is required on this and 
other technical issues. Interesting extensions 
within the proposed framework can be made by 
also using shadowprices on goal targets and re- 
source budgets, as shown in Goedhart, 1994. 
5. Evaluation 
This paper presents a framework for an inter- 
active procedure to solve decentralized decision 
problems with multiple goals and multiple deci- 
sion makers for a compromise solution that aims 
to be close to Pareto-optimal. It uses straightfor- 
ward concepts in transmitting relevant informa- 
tion on divisional opportunities in a compact way 
to central management. Solving the individual 
decision problems at the various management 
levels does not require complex information from 
the decision makers because of the interactive 
multiple goal programming method used. Also 
the formulation of divisional proposals that are 
contingent on resource budgets and performance 
targets as set by central management to direct 
divisional activities is straightforward and corre- 
sponds to management practice in large organiza- 
tions (cf. Goedhart, 1994). Furthermore, the pro- 
cedure generates an organizational compromise 
solution within a few planning cycles because 
relevant information on divisional opportunities 
is transmitted in a set of proposals per division. 
Because the divisional proposals and central bud- 
gets/targets are heuristically generated, it is diffi- 
cult to formally assess the interactive procedure's 
technical properties such as for example the 
Pareto-optimality of the resulting compromise so- 
lution. Of course, no proof follows from a single 
example such as the one above, in which the 
compromise solution is indeed close to Pareto- 
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